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Abstract
This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk-dove
game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoﬀs outside the convex
hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀs by privately recommending play. We ﬁnd that sub-
jects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations. We are able to implement this
correlated equilibrium, however, when subjects play against robots that always follow
recommendations, including in a control treatment in which human subjects receive
the robot "earnings." This indicates that the lack of mutual knowledge of conjectures,
rather than social preferences, explains subjects’ failure to play the suggested correlated
equilibrium when facing other human players.
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11 Introduction
Consider a normal form game with multiple Nash equilibria, and suppose we observe what
players play. We may then determine whether or not play corresponds to some particular
equilibrium with desirable characteristics. If not, then can we induce players to choose
this equilibrium? In this paper we report results from experiments which try to execute
a switch to a "better" (in a sense deﬁned later) equilibrium. We ﬁnd the posed question
relevant because games often have equilibria with undesirable characteristics. Even when
games are designed such that an equilibrium of the game satisﬁes some pre-set objective, it
is not always possible to achieve a unique equilibrium. For example, under moral hazard
in teams the designed wage structure may lead to multiple Nash equilibria (Holmstrom,
1982; Mookherjee, 1984). In such situations, one might want to design games that explicitly
incorporate coordination mechanisms. Under moral hazard in teams, once the wage schedules
are accepted one can employ a manager who simply recommends to each worker the amount
of eﬀort that each of them should input (Sharma and Torres, 2004). If the recommendations
are incentive compatible then theory tells us that they should be followed and therefore the
equilibrium that is desired should actually result. Is this really so, or is there a slip between
the cup and the lip? The goal of our paper is to investigate this question.
The experiments reported in this paper do not exhaust all the possible means to induce
coordination. Instead, we adopt a simple procedure. We instruct players to play their
respective strategies of a selected Nash equilibrium to implement a correlated equilibrium.
Simple as the procedure is, it is not without problems.1 First, our experiments provide
subjects with monetary payments. We do not observe the players’ utility (payoﬀ)o v e r
1In theoretical terms the payoﬀs, rationality and conjectures may not be common knowledge amongst the
players and the experimenter (see for example Aumann, 1998, and Gul, 1998).
2these payments. Hence, we cannot be certain about the set of equilibria in the actual game
that subjects play. Second, even if we were to know the payoﬀs, the designed incentive
compatible instructions may still fail to induce common knowledge of players’ conjectures
over their opponent’s play. This may happen because payoﬀs or rationality are not common
knowledge amongst players (for more on this see Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995). In
this paper we try to disentangle these two potential problems.
To ﬁx matters, consider the following symmetric hawk-dove game that is used in our
experiments (we shall motivate our choice of this game in the next section):
Left Right
Up 3, 3 48, 9
Down 9, 48 39, 39
The values in each cell are monetary transfers from the experimenter to the subjects.
If we assume that these transfers are equivalent to utilities, then the game has three Nash
equilibria. In addition to the {Down, Left} and {Up, Right} pure strategy Nash equilibria, it
has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which players choose Up and Left with probability
0.6. Mutual, and not necessarily common, knowledge of payoﬀs, rationality and conjectures
could result in one of these Nash equilibria (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995).
Our assumption on payoﬀs could, however, be wrong. Suppose Row’s utility is equal to
his monetary transfer less Column’s monetary transfer, a very simple form of rivalistic social
preferences.2 Then playing Up is a dominant strategy for him and he will not play Down
if instructed to do so. Now suppose our assumption that money transfers are equivalent to
utilities is correct. But also suppose that Row believes with probability one that Column is
rational and Column’s payoﬀ is equal to Column’s payoﬀ minus Row’s payoﬀ.T h u sp a y o ﬀs
2For recent inﬂuential models of social preferences, see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000).
3are not mutual knowledge. Then Row believes that Left is a dominant strategy for Column
and Column will always reject a recommendation to play right. Hence Row will always
ignore the instruction to play Up. Thus we see that a player may reject instructions for two
reasons. First, given his payoﬀ it is optimal for the player to not follow instructions. This is
an example where our assumption on payoﬀs is wrong. Second, our assumption on payoﬀs
is correct, but the player does not follow his recommendation because he believes that his
opponent will not follow her recommendation.
We start our exercise by observing randomly matched subjects play the game. We as-
sume that payoﬀs are equivalent to monetary transfers. Our observations cannot reject the
hypothesis that the subjects are playing the mixed strategy equilibrium where Up and Left
a r ec h o s e nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y0 . 6 . G i v e nt h i sﬁnding, we proceed to implement a diﬀerent
Nash equilibrium.
To induce a diﬀerent Nash equilibrium we recommend an action to each player. Rec-
ommending actions actually transforms the original game into a signalling game where each
player receives a signal (which does not aﬀect payoﬀs) prior to the choice of strategies. The
Nash equilibrium of the game with signals is then a correlated equilibrium of the original
game. The set of all consistent signal structures then generate the set of all correlated equi-
libria. The set of correlated equilibria includes the Nash equilibria of the original game as
these can be seen as resulting from independent signals (Hart and Mas Colell, 2000). Thus,
by appropriately choosing recommendations (signals) we can induce players to coordinate
on a given correlated equilibrium. Assuming that subjects’ payoﬀs are equal to their mone-
tary transfers we try to induce a correlated equilibrium "close" to the symmetric correlated
equilibrium which maximizes joint payoﬀs. This equilibrium puts probabilities 0.375, 0.375,
0.25 on {Up, Right}, {Down, Left} and {Down, Right}.
4Suppose the experimenter wants to implement this "optimal" symmetric correlated equi-
librium. He publicly announces a loaded dice with three faces {Up, Right}, {Down, Left}
and {Down, Right} that occur with probabilities 0.375, 0.375, 0.25. The subjects do not get
to see the outcome of dice rolled by the experimenter. The experimenter sees the outcome
and privately recommends the respective strategies to the players. Suppose the row player
is given the recommendation to play Down. Assuming he is able to correctly update proba-
bilities using Bayes’ rule, then he would know that with probabilities .375
.625 and .25
.625 Column
has been asked to play Left and Right. (It is well known, however, that laboratory subjects
frequently fail to use Bayes’ rule.) If Row were to also know that Column follows recommen-
dations then this knowledge is suﬃcient for him to make an optimal choice. In particular, if
his payoﬀ is equal his monetary transfer, then optimization would induce him to follow the
recommendation and choose Down.
When we run the experiments with recommendations we ﬁnd that players frequently
reject recommendations. Why does this occur? It could simply be that our payoﬀ speciﬁca-
tions are wrong. Or it could be that our speciﬁcations are correct but players do not believe
that their opponents will follow recommendations.
To investigate the problem we ﬁrst run a treatment where each subject plays a robot. It
is announced that robots will always follow their recommended strategy. We observe in this
treatment that subjects almost always follow recommendations. This ﬁnding suggests that if
opponents were known to follow their recommendations then it is optimal for the subject to
also follow recommendations. Since optimization is done by subjects over their payoﬀs, we
a r eu n a b l et or e j e c tt h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tw eh a ds p e c i ﬁed payoﬀs correctly. However, payoﬀs
could still be misspeciﬁed in the game with human subjects. This is because playing against
robots should substantially reduce or even eliminate concerns about social preferences. To
5check whether social preferences cause the problem when subjects face human opponents,
we repeated the robot treatments with a variation. The monetary amounts "earned" by the
robot are transferred to a non playing human subject. Again we observed that recommen-
dations were almost always followed. This indicates that recommendations are not followed
when subjects face human opponents primarily because they believe that their opponents
will not follow recommendations.
We also determined if experience could induce subjects to believe that their opponents
would follow recommendations. We brought back subjects who followed recommendations
in the robot opponent treatments to play each other. This group rejected recommendations
as often as another experienced group who always played against human subjects.
In answering the question that we started with, our results indicate that communication
through instructions is not suﬃcient to induce players to switch to any chosen equilibrium. It
seems that this is not because players do not want to switch to the recommended equilibrium,
but because they believe that their opponents will not switch. We shall provide further
thoughts on this in the concluding section.
2T h e G a m e
As mentioned above we study behavior in a simple, symmetric hawk-dove game. A feature
of this game which is suitable for our purpose is that it has multiple (three) Nash equilibria.
Furthermore, it has correlated equilibrium outcomes with higher joint payoﬀst h a td on o t
lie in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium outcomes. Thus, recommendations through an
impartial mediator could potentially induce these superior outcomes.
Our game could occur naturally as an outcome of a design problem. To see this we
construct a simple example following Sharma and Torres (2004). Consider a situation where
6two workers R and C have to jointly put in unobservable eﬀort to produce output. Eﬀort
can be high or low, i.e. eh or el with eh >e l. If both workers put in high eﬀort then the
value of the output is 156; if both put in low eﬀort it is 6 and if one puts in low eﬀort
and other puts in high eﬀort it is 96. Call these states H, L and M respectively. The
w o r k e r sh a v et od e s i g naw a g es c h e d u l ec o n t i n g e n to nt h ev a l u eo ft h ep r o d u c t ,i . e . t h e
state. For credibility, the sum of the wages should equal the value of the product in each
state (Holmstrom, 1982). Given a state, constrain wages to be equal amongst workers for
reasons associated with fairness or the unobservability of eﬀort. It follows immediately that
the wage schedule {wL,w M,w H} = {3,48,78}. Let each worker have utility w − e,w h e r e
w is the wage received and e is the level of eﬀort put in. Let eh =3 9and el =0for both
workers. Then the game induced by the designed wage schedule is:
el (Left) eh (Right)
el (Up) 3, 3 48, 9
eh (Down) 9, 48 39, 39
This is exactly the game depicted in the introduction. In addition to the {Down, Left}
and {Up, Right} pure strategy Nash equilibria, this stage game has a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium in which players choose Up or Left with probability 0.6.
If workers can communicate, then is it possible for them to coordinate their actions (i.e.
play a correlated equilibrium)? Figure 1 shows the convex hull of the Nash equilibrium
payoﬀs, as well as the set of correlated equilibrium payoﬀs. The set of correlated equilibrium
payoﬀs can be characterized by assigning weights (a11, a12,a 21,a 22) (or a distribution over
t h ef o u rp u r es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁl e s{ U p ,L e f t } ,{ U p ,R i g h t } ,{ D o w n ,L e f t }a n d{ D o w n ,R i g h t } )
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The idea here can be understood as follows. The workers employ an impartial mediator
or manager (whose payoﬀ, normalized to zero, is the same irrespective of the outcome).
The manager recommends strategies for both players according to the commonly known
distribution (a11, a12,a 21,a 22). Given their knowledge, the distribution should be such that
it is in the players’ incentive to play the strategies that they are instructed to play. The ﬁrst
two inequalities are the incentive compatibility constraints for the row player to play Up
and Down respectively. The second two inequalities for the column player to play Left and
Right respectively. The set of all convex sets generated by these inequalities depict the set
of all correlated equilibria payoﬀs. In particular, the convex hull of Nash equilibria payoﬀs
lie strictly within this set.
Perfect cooperation payoﬀs (39, 39) lie outside the set of correlated equilibrium payoﬀs.
Note that many points in the convex hull of correlated equilibrium payoﬀs are inferior to those
i nt h eN a s he q u i l i b r i u m .O n eo ft h ek e yf e a t u r e st h a tl e du st ou s et h i sg a m e ,h o w e v e r ,i st h a t
there exist correlated equilibria that provide joint payoﬀs greater than those generated by
any Nash equilibrium. For example, the highest symmetric payoﬀs that can be implemented
as a correlated equilibrium provide a payoﬀ of 31.125 to each player. Players are, however,
indiﬀerent between their action choices for recommendations in this equilibrium. So in order
to make choices unique best responses for equilibrium beliefs we attempted to implement a
correlated equilibrium strictly inside the hull of correlated equilibrium payoﬀsa ss h o w ni n
Figure 1. In this correlated equilibrium the costly {Up, Left} outcome is never realized. The
pure strategy Nash equilibria are each played 40 percent of the time, and the cooperative
outcome {Down, Right} is realized 20 percent of the time. In this equilibrium each player
9earns an expected payoﬀ of 30.6. No Nash equilibrium of the stage game can generate these
payoﬀs.
3 Experimental Design
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design and the allocation of human subjects to treat-
ment conditions. All treatments with human opponents randomly rematched pairs of sub-
jects each period to minimize the potential impact of reciprocal concerns. Treatment A
serves as a baseline, in which subjects played the game with no recommendations. All other
treatments employed play recommendations in an attempt to implement the correlated equi-
librium described above. Theoretically, any correlating device could suﬃce to implement the
equilibrium. Subtle devices such as blinking colored squares on subjects’ computer screens
to implement coordination do not work well unless subjects ﬁrst experience real shocks to
condition their beliefs to support coordination (Marimon et al., 1993). Therefore, we chose
to be very explicit in our recommendations and the correlation process that leads to the
recommendations. Each period we made a recommendation privately to each subject (e.g.,
"we recommend you choose left"). Following a pilot session in which some subjects appeared
to ignore recommendations, for the main study we even added an explicit (and exhaustive)
explanation of how subjects could update their beliefs following any recommendation, and
how it was in their best interest to follow their recommendation if they believed that their
opponent would also follow her recommendation. Our goal was to provide the most favorable
and rich information conditions to make the use of signals transparent and valuable.3
3The instructions are available at www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/cason/papers/corr-inst.pdf. When
referring to the subject’s counterpart in the game, the instructions avoid using competitive framing; that is,
we did not use the term “your opponent” unlike the presentation in this paper. The instructions also do not
use obviously cooperative framing such as “your playing partner.” Instead, they use more neutral (but also
more clumsy) framing such as “the participant you are paired with.”
10Table 1: Allocation of Subjects to Treatments
Index Treatment Experience Subjects Sessions
A Human opponents, no rec-
ommendations
None 52 subjects 4 sessions
B Human opponents, with rec-
ommendations
None 80 subjects 6 sessions
C Robot opponents, with rec-
ommendations, no one re-
ceives robot earnings
None 31 subjects 2 sessions
D Robot opponents, with rec-
ommendations, humans re-
ceive robot earnings
None 26 subjects 2 sessions




24 subjects 2 sessions




24 subjects 2 sessions
Notes: Human opponents changed randomly each period, with typically 12 or 14 subjects
participating in each session. Each session included 60 periods.
Several previous experiments have considered correlated equilibria or recommended ac-
tions in attempts to implement speciﬁc outcomes. Moreno and Wooders (1998) observe
outcomes consistent with a correlated equilibrium in a three-player matching pennies game.
Players achieve coordination through opportunities for nonbinding preplay communication.
Other experiments have used experimenter instructions to implement speciﬁc equilibria in
two-person coordination games (Van Huyck et al., 1992) or in four-person voluntary con-
tributions games (Seely et al., 2005), and have found considerable diﬃculty in inducing
subjects to follow recommendations. Brandts and MacLeod (1995) use experimenter recom-
mendations to implement various types of Nash equilibria (e.g., dominant strategy, imperfect
and subgame perfect). They also ﬁnd that subjects do not blindly follow recommendations,
particularly those corresponding to an imperfect equilibrium.
We also ﬁnd that subjects frequently do not follow recommendations. To gather informa-
11tion about the source of this behavior, in all of our treatments we elicited beliefs from subjects
regarding their expectations of their opponent’s upcoming actions. They were paid based
on the accuracy of their beliefs using a proper scoring rule (e.g., Nyarko and Schotter, 2002;
Ruström and Wilcox, 2004).4 These beliefs help provide insight into the learning process
of subjects over time, as well as information about how expectations adjust after subjects
receive play recommendations.5 Subjects submitted their beliefs at the same time they made
their action choice, after they received their action recommendation. Subjects’ per-period
earnings from their prediction accuracy varied between 0 and 10 experimental francs, so
usually subjects earned more from playing the game than from making predictions.
In the robot opponents treatments C and D subjects knew that their counterparts were
automated, and the instructions also emphasized that the robot opponents were programmed
to always follow their play recommendation without error. This introduces knowledge over
opponents following recommendations. But introducing robot opponents in treatment C also
substantially reduces the possible inﬂuence of social preferences, such as when subjects care
about the distribution of earnings between themselves and another person. For example, a
row player may more strongly dislike her payoﬀ in the {Up, Right} cell because her opponent
earns 48 while she earns only 9. Such social preferences are very unlikely to aﬀect subjects’
choices in treatment C because the opponent earnings are not distributed to another human
subject. Houser and Kurzban (2002) similarly use computerized opponents to limit the
inﬂuence of social preferences. The problem that arises, however, is that any behavioral
4In particular, the payoﬀ for a player reporting an Up prediction of rUp, for example, when her opponent
actually played Up, is πUp =1 0− 10(1 − rUp)2.
5As Ruström and Wilcox (2004) document, eliciting beliefs may also focus players’ attention on their
opponent’s play and promote belief-learning. In theory, risk-averse or risk-seeking subjects might bias their
reported belief to maximize expected utility, and a subject who integrates their belief and game choice
decisions might also report biased beliefs. Evidence reported by Oﬀerman et al. (1996), which includes
belief elicitation from "spectators" not playing the game, indicates that these concerns are not empirically
signiﬁcant.
12diﬀerences between treatments B and C could occur either because of diﬀerences in beliefs
over opponents following recommendations or because of the elimination of social preference
considerations. This is a classic problem of an experimental treatment confound.
The intermediate treatment D solves this confound problem. Like treatment C, subjects
play against robots who always follow recommendations. Like treatment B, another human
subject receives the earnings of the subject’s opponent. Therefore, if subjects care about the
distribution of earnings (as in well-known models such as Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, or Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000) then these social preferences will have a similar inﬂuence on choices in
treatments B and D. In the treatment D sessions half of the subjects played against robots
and their play determined their own earnings. The other half of the subjects simply received
these robot earnings and they could not aﬀect anyone’s payoﬀs. These “bystander” subjects
also played the same game 60 times (with recommendations) while they waited for the
other subjects to complete their decisions, although the instructions emphasized that these
decisions were irrelevant for anyone’s payoﬀs. (We do not analyze these hypothetical choice
data in this paper.) Subjects who did determine earnings were informed that the human who
received their opponent’s earnings changed randomly each round, as in all human opponent
player treatments.
We report data from the 237 subjects shown in the design table above, collected in 18
separate sessions, with typically 12 or 14 subjects participating in each session. Sessions
took about 60 to 90 minutes (including instructions) to complete, and subjects earned about
$22 on average.6
6We also varied the feedback that subjects received each period in treatments A and B. In some sessions
subjects learned only the outcome of the game they played, while in other sessions they learned the outcomes
of all games in the session and were provided with a continuously updated total of the cumulative frequency
of outcomes experienced by all pairs in their session. We found no evidence that play was sensitive to the
two types of outcome feedback, however, and therefore we pool the results for these two forms of feedback
in the analysis presented in the next section.
134R e s u l t s
4.1 Human Opponents With and Without Recommendations
Figure 2 presents the overall frequency of the cooperative Down/Right choices made in each
ten-period block of periods for the inexperienced sessions in which subjects played against
other human opponents (treatments A and B). Although the average frequency in both
treatments begins near the correlated equilibrium target of 0.6, the Down/Right choice rate
declines without recommendations until it reaches the mixed strategy equilibrium of 0.4 by
the end of the sessions. This average, of course, obscures some substantial diﬀerences across
individual subjects, since some nearly always chose Down or Right while others nearly always
chose Up or Left. What matters for the population game with random rematching is the
overall expected frequency in the population. When we consider the cross-sectional rate of
Down/Right choices calculated individually for each subject across the ﬁnal 30 periods of
the session, the mean rate of Down/Right is 0.43, which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the mixed strategy equilibrium of 0.4 (t-statistic = 0.78).7
The average frequency of the cooperative Down/Right choice also declines in the treat-
ment with recommendations, although it declines more slowly and does not fall below 0.5
until the ﬁnal 10 periods of the session. During the ﬁnal 30 periods, calculated across all
80 subjects in this treatment, the mean rate of Down/Right is 0.49. This frequency is sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from the mixed strategy equilibrium of 0.4 (t-statistic = 3.67) and is
also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the correlated equilibrium target of 0.6 (t-statistic = 4.09).
A comparison of the two treatments indicates that recommendations signiﬁcantly increased
7Throughout the results section we report cross-sectional t-statistics based on late (periods 31-60) averages
calculated for individual subjects and then compared to a theoretical benchmark or across treatments.
Virtually identical conclusions obtain if we employ standard errors that are calculated to be robust to
unmodeled correlation of choices within clusters deﬁned by the individual sessions.






















Human Opponents (Inexperienced), with Recommendations
Human Opponents (Inexperienced), No Recommendations
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
Average Rate Recommended in Recommendations Treatment
Figure 2:
t h er a t eo fc o o p e r a t i o n( D o w n / R i g h t ) ,b u ta tam a r g i n a l1 0p e r c e n ts i g n i ﬁcance level (one-
tailed), with t-statistic = 1.33.
The average proﬁts earned by subjects for these two treatments provides statistical evi-
dence that parallels the choice frequency data. During the ﬁnal 30 periods the cross-sectional
average proﬁt earned by subjects in the treatment without recommendations was 22.43,
which is marginally signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (at the 8 percent level) from the mixed strategy
equilibrium level of 21 (t-statistic = 1.78). Average proﬁts were 25.43 during these late
periods in the treatment with recommendations, which is highly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
both the mixed strategy equilibrium of 21 (t-statistic = 8.00) and from the correlated equi-
librium target of 30.6 (t-statistic = 9.34). A comparison across treatments concludes that
15recommendations signiﬁcantly increased proﬁts compared to the treatment without recom-
mendations (t-statistic = 3.18). The greater statistical signiﬁcance across treatments for
proﬁts, compared to the frequency of Down/Right choices, indicates that recommendations
did increase coordination and were partially successful in reducing the frequency of the worst
{Up, Left} outcome. For example, the {Up, Left} outcome occurs in 31.0 percent of the ﬁnal
30 rounds without recommendations, compared to 19.7 percent of the ﬁnal 30 rounds with
recommendations. Although both are below the mixed strategy equilibrium prediction of
0.62 = 0.36, recommendations clearly failed to reduce the rate of this outcome to zero.
This result obviously requires subjects to frequently disregard their recommendations.
As documented more in the next subsection, during the ﬁnal 30 periods the subjects in
this human opponent treatment followed their recommendations only 80.4 percent of the
time. The rate was substantially higher for the Up/Left recommendation (88.3 percent)
than for the Down/Right recommendation (75.1 percent). This ﬁnding led us to introduce
t h et r e a t m e n t sw i t hr o b o to p p o n e n t s .
4.2 Robot Opponents
T a b l e2d i s p l a y st h ea v e r a g ep r o ﬁts earned by subjects in all treatments for the second
half of the sessions (periods 31-60). Recall that in the treatments with robot opponents
the subjects were fully aware that they were interacting with robots, and furthermore the
instructions emphasized that the robots would always follow their recommendations. We
present a separate column to indicate the average proﬁtt h a ts u b j e c t sw o u l de a r ni ft h e y
always followed recommendations. The mean "recommended proﬁt" is diﬀerent in the robot
opponent treatments (26.73) from the target correlated equilibrium of 30.6 because we used
the same random sequence of recommendations for all subjects facing robots to reduce across-
16subject variation. (This explains the zero standard error for this recommended mean.) The
recommended proﬁts are lower when subjects faced robots because the random sequence of
recommendations used in the robot-opponent sessions happened to have fewer Right recom-
mendations for the robot than expected during these late periods. Therefore, our discussion
and statistical analysis will focus on the ratio of actual to recommended proﬁts (displayed
in the rightmost column of the table) to normalize proﬁts by their recommended level.
























C Robot opponents, with rec-



































The table indicates that proﬁts relative to the recommended target increase when we
control subjects’ beliefs about the opponents’ rationality and propensity to follow recom-
mendations using the robot opponents. The inexperienced subjects facing human opponents
(treatment index B) obtained less than 83 percent of the recommendations benchmark. By
contrast, the inexperienced subjects facing robot opponents (treatment indexes C and D)
17obtained over 90 percent of the recommendations benchmark. This diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant (t-statistic = 3.87). We conducted this test based on data pooled across the two
robot opponents treatments, because the data fail to reject the hypothesis that any behavior
or outcomes diﬀer across treatments C and D (t-statistic = 0.29 for proﬁts, t-statistic = 0.52
for rates of cooperation, and t-statistic = 0.52 for average rates that recommendations were
followed).
The improvement in relative proﬁt performance when subjects played against robots
instead of humans can be attributed to their greater willingness to follow recommendations
when playing against robots. Figure 3 displays the rates that players followed each type of
recommendation across the diﬀerent treatments. Subjects in all treatments followed Up/Left
recommendations more frequently than Down/Right recommendations, which is analyzed
later in subsection 4.4. Note that the rate subjects followed Down/Right recommendations
when facing human opponents declined steadily over time. Controlling for the content of
the recommendation, the ﬁgure clearly illustrates that subjects were more willing to follow
recommendations on average when facing robot opponents. This diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant (t-statistic = 2.56).
Of course, the treatment averages in these ﬁgures obscure some considerable variation
across individuals, and some individuals in all treatments followed recommendations con-
sistently. To highlight this heterogeneity, Figure 4 displays the cumulative distribution of
the rates that individual subjects in each treatment followed their recommendations. Note
that 40 to 50 percent of the individual subjects in the robot opponents treatments always
followed their recommendations. Pooling across the two robot treatments, which is justiﬁed
because the two treatments are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent,8 three-quarters of the subjects
8The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test p-value = 0.641. Note that this test can be applied because
the individual subjects’ choices in the robot-opponents data are statistically independent.

















































Inexperienced Human Opponents, Down/Right Recommendation
Robot Opponents, Robots Receive Earnings, Down/Right Recommendation
Robot Opponents, Humans Receive Earnings, Down/Right Recommendation
Inexperienced Human Opponents, Up/Left Recommendation
Robot Opponents, Robots Receive Earnings, Up/Left Recommendation
Robot Opponents, Humans Receive Earnings, Up/Left Recommendation
Up or Left Recommendations
Down or Right Recommendations
Figure 3:
playing against robots followed the recommendations at least 90 percent of the time. By
contrast, less than one-quarter of the individual subjects in the human opponents treatment
always followed their recommendation, and less than half followed their recommendations
at least 90 percent of the time. Remember that it is a strict best response for subjects to
follow their recommendation if they believe that their counterpart will also follow her rec-
ommendations. This ﬁg u r es u g g e s t st h a ts u c hb e l i e f sm a yn o tb ea c c u r a t ef o rt h eh u m a n
opponents treatment, and subsection 4.4 analyzes reported beliefs in detail.
















F Inexperienced Human Opponents
Robot Opponents, Robots Receive Earnings
Robot Opponents, Humans Receive Earnings
Figure 4:
4.3 Experienced Human Opponents
Table 2 above also reports the overall performance for subjects who were experienced in
one of the other treatments. Regardless of whether these subjects obtained experience play-
ing against other humans (treatment index E) or against robots (treatment index F), they
still earn only about 80 to 85 percent of the recommended proﬁt. Although proﬁts are
slightly higher when subjects received experience playing against robots, this diﬀerence is
not statistically signiﬁcant (t-statistic = 1.40). The two experienced treatments are also
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in their rates of cooperation (t-statistic = 0.54) or in their rates
that recommendations are followed (t-statistic = 0.07). We therefore pool these experienced
20treatment data in the remainder of the analysis.
The mean ratio of actual/recommended proﬁts across the 48 experienced subjects pooled
is 0.825, virtually identical to the inexperienced subjects facing human opponents (treat-
ment index B) mean of 0.829. Thus we conclude that experience does not improve proﬁt
performance (t-statistic = 0.14). During the late periods 31-60 of both types of sessions,
experienced subjects actually chose the cooperative Down/Right action slightly less than
did inexperienced subjects (47.4 percent compared to 49.5 percent of the time), although
this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (t-statistic = 0.50). During these late periods the experi-
enced subjects tended to follow recommendations more frequently than did inexperienced
subjects (85.2 percent compared to 80.4 percent of the time), but again this diﬀerence is
not statistically signiﬁcant (t-statistic = 1.24). Overall, we conclude that when subjects
play against other humans, increased subject experience does not improve the ability to
implement reliably the correlated equilibrium.
4.4 Beliefs
Recommendations provide information for subjects to update their beliefs regarding their
opponent’s action. Speciﬁcally, if subjects believe that opponents always follow recommen-
dations, after receiving a recommendation to play Up or Left they should report a belief that
their opponent will play Right or Down with certainty because the correlated equilibrium
being implemented never selects the bad {Up, Left} matrix cell; and after receiving a recom-
mendation to play Down or Right they should report a belief that their opponent will play
Right or Down with probability one-third. Recall also that we elicited beliefs from subjects
and paid them for their accuracy using a proper scoring rule.
Figure 5 summarizes the beliefs data for the last 30 periods of the sessions and indi-
cates that the recommendations did shift average reported beliefs in the predicted direction;
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Figure 5:
however, they also indicate that subjects did not always expect a human counterpart to
follow her recommendation. This is illustrated most clearly on the left side of the ﬁgure.
Instead of adjusting conditional beliefs to 1 following recommendations to play Up or Left,
when inexperienced subjects played against human opponents their Right/Down belief only
increased on average to about 0.77. Experienced subjects report beliefs following recommen-
dations that slightly exceed 0.9 on average, but beliefs do not shift to the prediction of 100
Right/Down except when subjects played against robots. The right side of this ﬁgure shows
that average beliefs following a recommendation to play Down or Right roughly correspond
to the prediction of one-third for all treatments, varying between 0.25 and 0.4.
22Difference in Expected Payoffs Conditional on Updated Beliefs for 
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Difference Based on Conditional
Belief in Correlated Equilibrium
Figure 6:
This shift of beliefs following an Up/Left recommendation to less than 100 percent
Right/Down when subjects played against humans is consistent with the actual rates that
human subjects followed their recommendations. As shown above in Figure 3, inexperi-
enced players facing human opponents followed Down/Right recommendations roughly 75
to 80 percent of the time; moreover, they followed this recommendation at a declining rate
across the 60 periods. Experienced players facing human opponents (not shown) followed
Down/Right recommendations 83 percent of the time during periods 1-20, but only 72 to
78 percent of the time during periods 41-60. Therefore the reported beliefs were reasonably
accurate given the actual rates that human opponents followed recommendations.
23Figure 6 summarizes the incentives that subjects have to follow recommendations given
their reported beliefs. By design, incentives are much stronger to follow an Up/Left recom-
m e n d a t i o n ,w h i c hi sd i s p l a y e do nt h el e f ts i d eo ft h i sﬁgure. The expected payoﬀ diﬀerence
for following an Up/Left recommendation in this correlated equilibrium is nine times higher
than for following a Down/Right recommendation. Nevertheless, note that because beliefs
do not fully adjust to 100 percent Right/Down following this recommendation, the expected
payoﬀ diﬀerential from following an Up/Left recommendation for inexperienced subjects is
about one-half of the diﬀerential based on beliefs that their counterpart will always follow
her recommendation. The right side of the ﬁgure indicates that subjects have considerably
weaker incentives to follow a Down/Right recommendation. If subjects are more likely to
make errors that have a lower expected cost, as in the quantal response equilibrium (McK-
elvey and Palfrey, 1995), then we would expect that Down/Right recommendations would
b ef o l l o w e da tal o w e rr a t et h a nU p / L e f tr e c o mmendations. This is exactly the pattern of
behavior that our data exhibits (Figure 3).9
5C o n c l u s i o n
We started by asking whether players can be induced to choose some particular equilibrium of
a game with signals through recommended play. Our results indicate that recommendations
are not suﬃcient to induce players to switch to any chosen equilibrium. Subjects do not
switch because they believe that their opponents will not switch. This much is clear. But
9If we exclude the cases of indiﬀerence or "near-indiﬀerence," deﬁned as situations in which reported
beliefs indicate that the two choices’ expected proﬁts diﬀer by less than ﬁve percent, we ﬁnd that beliefs
support following Up/Left recommendations much more frequently than Down/Right recommendations. In
particular, reported beliefs indicate that it is optimal to follow 90 percent of the Up/Left recommendations,
but only 51 percent of the Down/Right recommendations. Both recommendations are usually followed (82
to 92 percent of the time) when beliefs indicate that it is optimal to follow them, and both recommendations
are followed about 70 percent of the time even when the beliefs indicate that rejecting the recommendation
is optimal.
24why is this so? Given the lack of theory in this domain and given our process of data
collection, we are unable to provide a complete answer to this question. Nevertheless we
take a bold stride and oﬀer some conjectures.
The reader may conclude from our data that recommendations were not totally rejected.
Nearly one-quarter of subjects who played against human opponents always followed recom-
mendations. Furthermore, our results on beliefs indicate that experienced subjects assigned
more probability to opponents following recommendations than did inexperienced subjects.
Moreover, these beliefs were fairly compatible with actual play of opponents. Thus we are
tempted to say that, given suﬃcient time subjects would follow recommendations. But why
don’t subjects follow recommendations immediately? We provide the following conjecture.
Perhaps subjects have belief hierarchies where they believe that their opponents follow rec-
ommendations but make mistakes and choose a diﬀerent action with a certain probability,
they believe that their opponent believes that the subject in question makes mistakes with
some probability and so on. Given such a hierarchy, under certain conditions subjects are
able to form a belief over their opponent’s play (Brandenberger and Dekel, 1993). Given
these beliefs, subjects choose their optimal actions. Based on these observed actions sub-
jects form a diﬀerent hierarchy of beliefs with potentially diﬀerent probabilities of making
mistakes. This diﬀerent belief hierarchy determines present choice of actions. Our results
seem to suggest that hierarchies put less weight on mistakes over time. From a theoretical
perspective it would be interesting to know under what conditions would probabilities on
mistakes (in belief hierarchies) converge to zero.
Our conjecture on mistakes, as stated above, stems from our observations on data from
the robot treatments. Here, subjects almost always followed the Up or Left recommen-
dations, whereas only around ninety percent of the subjects followed the Down or Right
25recommendation (see Figure 3). Note that after the Up or Left recommendation, updated
probabilities imply that the robot would play Right or Down with probability one. Since
t h ei n s t r u c t i o n sc l e a r l ys t a t et h a tt h eo u t c o m e( U p ,L e f t )w i l ln e v e rb er e c o m m e n d e d ,e v e n
av i s u a lv e r i ﬁcation of the matrix suggests the correct updating. However, for a Right or
Down recommendation subjects have to actually ‘calculate’ the updated probabilities. It is
quite plausible for subjects to make mistakes in these calculations. Suppose this is true and
assume that subjects know it. Now consider the treatments with human subjects and note
that a little more than ten percent of the subjects did not follow even the Up or Left recom-
mendation. But this is now understandable. A subject given a Up recommendation (say)
knows for certain that her opponent is given the Right recommendation. But, opponents
make mistakes when they are given the Right recommendation. So, it may not always be
optimal for our subject to follow the Up recommendation. Similarly, for the Right or Down
recommendation.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our objective was to implement a correlated
equilibrium with payoﬀs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoﬀs, and not any
arbitrary correlated equilibrium. It may well be that it is easier to make subjects shift to
another correlated equilibrium, such as one in which the Down/Left (9, 48) and Up/Right
(48, 9) cells are recommended with equal probability.10 B u te v e nt h e nw ew o u l db eb o g g e d
down by questions similar to the ones raised above. Why do we expect subjects to believe
that their opponents will follow recommendations? Similarly, our results may also suggest
that there is a set of implementable "behavioral correlated equilibria" smaller than the set
of correlated equilibrium. The boundaries of this set are deﬁned by incentives large enough
10The expected payoﬀ incentive to follow recommendations in this correlated equilibrium ranges between
6 and 9, depending on the recommendation, which is similar to the incentive (9) that led Up/Left recom-
mendations to be followed by subjects in the current experiment.
26relative to "behavioral noise" arising from human tendencies to make mistakes. Determining
the set of "behavioral correlated equilibria" through experiments is a desirable exercise. But
then theory still has to deal with the question as to what set of correlated equilibria can be
implemented through simple recommendations and what set of correlated equilibria cannot.
Our paper suggests that the latter set exists.
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